Review Article. D. Bickerton, Roots of Language by Muysken, P.C.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/14540
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-07-07 and may be subject to
change.
REVIEW ARTICLE
R oots  o f  la n g u a g e .  B y  D e r e k  B i c k e r t o n .  Ann Arbor: Karoma, 1981. Pp. xiii,
351. $24.95.
Reviewed b y  P i e t e r  M u y s k e n ,  Universiteit van Amsterdam
Not only because Bickerton has succeeded in making a linguistic problem 
interesting beyond the confines of the discipline— and not only because of the 
wit and the clarity of his book— but especially because of the cogency and 
coherence of his vision, Roots o f  language merits the attention it is receiving. 
Here the book will be approached from various perspectives: the origins of 
B’s thinking, its precise relation to the generativist research program, and its 
position within the field of creole studies. Most important, of course, is an 
appraisal of the argument, and the evidence presented for it. I will start with 
a summary.
The structure of B’s argument is quite transparent. In Chap. I, he shows that 
a number of syntactic differences exist between Hawaiian Creole English 
(HCE) and its immediate ancestor, Hawaiian Pidgin English (HPE). These 
differences reflect developments which cannot be explained in terms of the 
contributing prestige language (English) or non-prestige languages (primarily 
Japanese and the Philippine languages), but must be the result of some general 
cognitive strategies at the disposal of the generation of learners that ‘created’ 
HCE.
To see whether these cognitive strategies are part of a general, not exclusively 
linguistic problem-solving capacity— or rather, part of a very specific ‘language 
faculty’— Chap. II is dedicated to comparing HCE syntax with that of other 
creole languages. B concludes that these creoles indeed share numerous syn­
tactic features with HCE. Thus he concludes that the cognitive strategies by 
which creoles have been derived from their unstructured pidgin ancestors are 
specific to language, part of the genetically-transferred and species-determined 
‘bio-program’. Otherwise, there would be much more variety than B has found.
But the bio-program which assists children in creatively constructing a full- 
fledged creole language must also be available to children learning or recon­
structing already existing languages; hence B ’s Chap. Ill reviews language 
acquisition studies. Two types of evidence are deemed relevant here: creative 
‘mistakes’, and evidence of early acquisition of specific categories and dis­
tinctions. Even though B’s discussion is based on a somewhat cumbersome 
and tentative re-analysis of published material, gathered for quite different 
purposes, he concludes that considerable evidence exists for a bio-program 
conception of natural language acquisition.
Chap. IV turns to the much more nebulous question of the origin of language 
in general. B argues at length that, preceding any emergence of language proper, 
some rather elaborate cognitive structure must have existed, in the form of 
distinctions available to pre-hominid species. These distinctions, B claims, are 
the same as those which are most basic to creoles, and as those which children 
acquire earliest and most automatically. In that sense, creole genesis and first- 
language acquisition both recapitulate, on a somewhat more abstract level, the
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genesis of language. The study of creole languages then becomes crucial to 
universalist linguistics, because it shows something of the natural state of lan­
guage, not yet overlain by all kinds of culturally determined changes.
The main part of this review will be dedicated to reviewing the evidence 
from creoles that B adduces for his hypothesis. Before that, however, some 
other issues need to be cleared away.
B’s thinking in Roots  is part of the essentially Romantic tradition which 
considers creole languages somehow to represent a natural state. This goes 
back to Bickerton 1974, in which the strikingly parallel development of creole 
Tense/Mood/Aspect (TMA) particle systems is explained in terms of a uni­
versal, neurolinguistically-based, cognitive map, much as in Roots. The rele­
vant distinctions— (non-)anterior, (ir-)realis, and (non-)punctual— arose 
because they are the primary ones that a language user needs to make sense of 
the world. The most important external influence in that paper (acknowledged 
by B) was Givón 1974, which deals mainly with West African Krio verb seri­
alization; there the universal cognitive structures of B’s approach were termed 
the ‘universal substratum’ on which a learner can draw when constructing a 
grammar of an incompletely accessible target. The alternative, of course, is a 
‘particular substratum’, the grammar of a particular language or linguistic fam­
ily which may influence the reconstruction process. A slightly different ap­
proach was taken in a paper of the same period by Kay & Sankoff 1974, where 
universal processes are claimed to be involved in the genesis of pidgins, not 
creoles (contrary to B ’s position then and now).
B ’s 1974 paper influenced the course of creole studies considerably, and 
Roots summarizes in part the results of the work thus inspired. In a series of 
studies on New Guinea Tok Pisin since 1974, Sankoff and her associates have 
argued that the expansion in its use over several generations, rather than the 
cognitive requirements of a single generation of creole creators (as B has it), 
has led to the elaboration of Tok Pisin as a native language (cf. Sankoff 1980). 
This line of research is largely ignored by B, for reasons to be discussed 
below— but mainly to his detriment. Finally, B also ignores work related to 
the Stanford Universals Project (Greenberg et al. 1978), some of which is re­
markably close to the spirit of B's work (cf. Traugott 1978, which pays con­
siderable attention to creoles).
Readers of Roots  will recognize and, perhaps, in many cases be moved by 
the same fervor that was generated by, e.g., Chomsky 1968. The methodolog­
ical postulates and the aims of B’s research program seem identical with those 
of the generativist program. To be sure, B notes that the generativist program 
assumes instantaneous acquisition, while the bio-program model postulates a 
dynamic expansion; but the instantaneity assumption is surely no more than 
an abstraction— characteristic of earlier studies in the generative paradigm, but 
now abandoned in favor of parameter theory and other ‘dynamic’ models of 
acquisition.1 The main difference which emerges is that the core of B’s results
1 In the exchange between Harnad and Chomsky from which B quotes the beginning (Harnad 
et al. 1976:57), Chomsky goes on to compare the language faculty to other organs, some of which 
mature long after birth.
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is a set of paradigmatic semantic distinctions, assumed to be part of the bio­
program; but the Chomskyan tradition, of course, is directed toward syntag- 
matic, configurational constraints. This focus on semantic paradigms, I will 
attempt to show, is latent but pervasive in B's work.
I am not sufficiently familiar with the literature on language origin, primate 
communication, or first-language acquisition to provide a knowledgeable cri­
tique of the ideas presented in B's Chaps. I l l—IV, or to say how representative 
B’s sources are. Thus I will focus on the creole data, on the extent to which 
they support the bio-program hypothesis, and on their relevance for the ac­
quisition and language origin discussions.
A survey of the creole data is given in Table 1, which will serve as a basis for discussion. Note 
that, although HPE shows different word-orders depending on the ethnic origin of its speakers, B 
claims that HCE has basic SVO order and two movement transformations: Object Fronting and 
Predicate Fronting.
First, something about SVO order (item A). It is remarkable that none of the orders characterizing 
HPE survive in HCE; but SVO is of course the order of the English superstrate. It is a fact that 
virtually all creoles have SVO order (the exceptions being perhaps Sri Lanka Portuguese Creole 
with SOV (I. Smith 1979), and Afrikaans with SOV/V-2nd, but both may have had too much 
superstrate input for B to consider them.) Indeed, most European target languages (cf. French, 
Portuguese, Spanish) also have that order, and most West African potential contributors as well. 
Still, it is striking that the flexibility of Spanish and Portuguese in allowing verb-initial order has 
disappeared entirely in the Portuguese creoles and in Papiamentu— for reasons similar, I will show, 
to that which explains the contrast between HCE and Guyanese Creole English (B, p. 53). Re­
markable also is the fact that Negerhollands, a Dutch Creole, has SVO (even though Dutch is SOV/ 
V-2nd, and Dutch ‘foreigner talk' being mostly SOV). Perhaps the strongest evidence thus far that 
the creole SVO order does not sifriply result from the contributing languages, but is typical of 
language genesis in general, is provided by the recently described Berbice Dutch Creole (Robertson 
1982), which was demonstrably created by a majority of Ijo-speaking slaves (Ijo being one of the 
rare SOV languages of West Africa) with Dutch input .2 Thus SVO may be characteristic of creole 
genesis; but if we take the acquisition data seriously, it is disqualified for the bio-program: I am 
aware of no evidence that children impose SVO on other types of input. The other problem, of 
course, is that no plausible account has yet been given to explain why subsequent ‘cultural lan­
guages’ (B, 296) would develop SOV orders out of the biological SVO order.
B’s account of movement rules in the creoles (items B -E  in Table 1) makes the following claims:
(a) All movement is leftward.
(b) All movement rules serve to focus the moved constituent.
(c) The fact that a moved verb leaves a copy behind, in its original site, results from perceptual 
constraints.
(d) The presence or absence of an introductory particle is related to the degree of superstrate 
influence.
All these claims are problematic. To begin with item D, B’s own data (21) show that HCE does 
not have Predicate Fronting, but rather has Subject NP Postposing, hence rightward movement. 
Consider his example:
( 1) difren bilifs dei get, sam gaiz  ‘Some guys have different beliefs.’
Presumably this is derived from
(2) sam  gaiz dei get difren bilifs.
B claims this happens through Predicate Fronting and Object Fronting; but the placement of dei 
shows that this cannot be correct. If dei were adjoined to the subject, as B claims (p. 36, tree 83),
2 N. Smith et al. ( m s ) show that Berbice Dutch Creole contains a large non-Dutch vocabulary, 
much of which is again traceable to Ijo— far more than to any other African language.
HPE HCE GCE JCE CCE SRA MCF SCF RCF HCF PAP STC CRI PAK ALMC
A. *SVO -  + +
B. Object/Adverb Fronting -  + + + + +
C. c o p  and Object/Adverb Fronting +
D. *Predicate Fronting + ---
E. *V Fronting --- +
F. Article system of HCE + + +
G. TMA system of HCE + + +
H. *Realized/Unrealized + + + + * *
I. *Dei/i copying and A/A -1- + +
J. *Relative pronouns --- +
K. *Negation indef. subj. 9• + + +
L. Existential/Possessive + + + + +
M. *Copula system +
N. * Adjectives/Verbs + + + + * +
0 . Questions without movement + + +
P. *Wh Movement +
Q. Compound wH-words + + + + + * + +
R. Passive through diathesis + + + +
T a b l e  1.
Schematic representation of the creole evidence in B’s Chaps. I—II for the ‘bio-program’ hypothesis. An asterisk at the beginning of a row refers to 
conceptual difficulties discussed in this review. An asterisk in the matrix itself refers to a counter-example to one of B's general claims. A blank means 
‘unspecified by B \  The points without an asterisk will not be explicitly discussed in this review.
Abbreviations for languages: HPE, Hawaiian Pidgin English; HCE, Hawaiian Creole English; GCE, Guyanese Creole English; JCE, Jamaican Creole 
English; CCE, Cameroon Creole English; SRA, Sranan; MCF, Mauritian Creole French; SCF, Seychelles Creole French; RCF, Réunion Creole French; 
HCF, Haitian Creole French; PAP, Papiamentu; STC, Sao Tomé Creole Portuguese; CRI, Sénégal Creole Portuguese (Crioulo); PAK, Papia Kristang. 
A l m o s t  refers to ‘all or most’ creoles.
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the following would result:
(3) * d i f r e n  b i l i f s  g e t ,  s a m  g a i z  d e i .
The same result obtains for VP Fronting if, as I would suggest (although it is impossible to argue 
this from the few examples given), d e i  is really part of a u x  (or i n f l ,  in the terminology of Chomsky 
1981), in the same way as the Tok Pisin predicate marker /, and never part of the subject NP. It 
cannot, therefore, occur between the antecedent and the relative clause (cf. B, 35, exx. 76, 80). 
However, assuming that NP Postposing gives us the right result (when combined, of course, with 
Object Postposing), then HCE would differ from Guyanese Creole (53) in the same way as Italian 
from English: the fact that the a u x / i n f l  system contains a subject marker makes Subject Postposing 
possible. And this alternative analysis implies (a) that not all movement rules are focus-fronting;
(b) that the difference between HCE and Guyanese Creole is not the presence of a VP node in the 
former; and (c) that B’s invocation of Chomsky's A-over-A principle to account for the distribution 
of d e i  and similar markers in other creoles (36, 64) is unnecessary. In fact, d e i  must be separable 
from the subject, e.g. by an adverb (as shown by B's ex. 69, p. 34; see item I in Table 1, above).
Regarding item E: while many creole languages have an NP Fronting rule for focus (as do hosts 
of other SVO languages), the V fronting/copying rule, resulting in examples like the following from 
Guyanese Creole, is much rarer:
(4) a sii Jan bin sii wan uman ‘John had s e e n  a woman.'
This type of rule also shows much more variation. In African languages like Bete (Koopman 1982) 
and Kikuyu (George Clements, p.c.) it is unbounded, as also in Haitian Creole (Piou 1982); but in 
Papiamentu it is clause-bounded. In Haitian Creole and in Guyanese Creole, it applies both to 
adjectives and to verbs; but in Papiamentu it applies only to verbs. (To be fair to B, this may be 
related to the fact that Papiamentu has a c o p  + a d j  construction, i.e. a separate class of adjectives, 
while Guyanese and Haitian Creole do not.) The semantics of the rule varies as well— in Papiamentu 
it is intensification; in Haitian Creole, verb focus; in Guyanese Creole, apparently both. A wider 
range of creole languages may yield even more differences. Finally, it should be mentioned that 
Haitian Creole has developed two parallel verb-fronting rules (cf. Piou). The unbounded one men­
tioned above, which signals focus, involves a marker s e ;  but another, translatable by ‘as soon as’, 
lacks s e , and is clause-bound:
(5) we-l-we zadam na ap vini, . .. 
see-he-see police d e t  a s p  come
‘As soon as he saw the policeman coming, . . . ’
As compared to the very regular Object/Adverb Fronting (item B), which (like the fronting of w h -  
elements, item P) may well figure in the bio-program, V Fronting shows great variety.
Although B’s account of the article systems and the TMA systems in Chaps. 11—111 is admirably 
precise, his treatment of complementation (both in creoles and in acquisition) is marred by lack 
of precision. In Chap. II he gives a striking parallel between different creoles, to the effect that 
they differentiate realized vs. unrealized purposive complements (often marked with the equivalents 
of g o  vs . f o r ) ;  cf. Table 1, item H. But in Chap. Ill, we read that child speech and creoles resemble 
each other in having formal identity between embedded and non-embedded sentences (185), which 
suggests that creoles would originally not have had any infinitival complements at all. In fact, it 
is notable that most creoles have chosen parallel ways of creating purposive complementizers from 
prepositions (a fact acknowledged by B, 61) and finite complementizers from deictic elements (cf. 
Dreifuss 1977, Sankoff & Brown 1976). B's concept that the bio-program calls for complementiz- 
erless, tensed, embedded clauses is not supported by what we know of creole complementation 
systems (see Table I , item J). His suggestion that creole relative clauses started out without relative 
clause markers (62) is not supported by any historical evidence that I know (cf. Dreifuss), except 
Sankoff & Brown's discussion of Tok Pisin relatives. To be sure, B excludes Tok Pisin from the 
creole languages under consideration, because the pidgin preceding it had a chance to expand 
without being a native language; but it is striking to see that Tok Pisin conforms to as many 
components of the bio-program as other, more ‘bona fide’ creoles. Thus it has serial verbs:
(6) kisim long Labaul na i-KisiM ¡-kam .
‘They get them in Rabaul and bring them.’
(7) n a  i - k i s i m  i-GO p l a n t i m  l o n g  p i e s  b o l o n g  e m .
‘and they get them and they go plant them in their own place.’
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(Cf. Fischer 1966:56 ff., where this type of example abounds, and the extensive discussion of Tok 
Pisin serialization in Muhlhausler 1979.) Tok Pisin has also developed an auxiliary system with 
preverbal particles, categorial parallels between adjectives and verbs, and passives through dia­
thesis. The Tok Pisin ia marker (cf. Sankoff & Brown) parallels the Haitian Creole la marker 
(Lefebvre 1982) in many respects. Clearly, Tok Pisin has features not found in other creoles, having 
been created in a rather different linguistic context and in a different way; but it also shares 
many features with other creoles. In fact, it should be mentioned that we know far too little about 
the early history of the Caribbean plantations to be sure that Tok Pisin is as atypical as B will 
have it.
B’s discussion of negation (item K) is marred by the fact that he does not always distinguish 
universal quantifiers from other negated subjects (66, 194); his discussion is not sufficiently precise 
to be more than suggestive. Neither is his treatment of the copula (item M), of which he writes: 
‘Practically all creoles show some similarities in this area’ (67). How much? More than a sample 
of other languages? Finally, the whole adjective/verb distinction problem (item N) has not yet been 
sufficiently developed theoretically to allow statements such as B’s, to the effect that we have no 
reason not to treat adjectives as a subclass of stative verbs (69). While these classes share some 
semantic properties (leading to a similar connection with the TMA system), the evidence with 
regard to their syntactic properties is mixed, to say the least. A detailed discussion of the issue 
for Sranan is given by Sebba 1982.
The remainder of B’s Chap. II is dedicated to two specific issues: the reality 
of his claims with respect to the general nature of the creole TMA systems, 
and a discussion of serial verbs. In the section on TMA systems (73-99), B 
shows himself at his argumentative best and his polemical worst, interpreting 
substantial agreement from a slightly different perspective as ‘challenge’ and 
‘attack’. A sample quote (77):
‘Muysken’s analysis is supported by two example sentences. The original form of the 
analysis he is attempting to undermine [sic], in Bickerton (1975, Chapter 2), is supported 
by ninety-eight example sentences. Further comment should be superfluous.’
In the study of creole languages, auxiliary preverbal particles have always been 
the focus of special interest. As mentioned above, they formed the basis of B’s 
universalist claims; and B has done more than anyone else toward a precise 
identification and interpretation of the creole TMA systems. Now that he is 
trying to bring the study of creole languages into the mainstream of linguistics, 
he cannot avoid dealing with two types of issues. One is methodological: What 
level of abstraction is he willing to admit in dealing with the data? What is the 
precise relation between his main (bio-program) theory and a number of aux­
iliary theories, needed to handle recalcitrant data? This area is now buried in 
an argumentative barrage.
The second type of issue is the relation of the creole results to the work on 
auxiliary systems carried out (a) in generative grammar, from Syntactic struc­
tures to the theory of infl in Chomsky 1981; (b) in typological studies, most 
extensively by Steele et al. 1981; and (c) in Tense and Modal Logic. Only scant 
attention is paid by B to these traditions— some of which have resulted in 
evidence supportive of B ’s thesis, and some in clearly contradictory evidence.
The end of Chap. II (99-132) is devoted to complementation. B seems to want to argue that the 
bio-program creoles have (or had) no such thing as non-finite clauses; this claim is taken up again 
in Chap. Ill, on acquisition. First, B shows that Guyanese Creole perception clauses have some 
finite characteristics: they can have nominative subjects and contain aspect markers. However, 
consider the impossibility of W h Fronting in
(8) *a \va m i hia [____ a n a k ?]
what I hear beating?
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This cannot  be at tr ibuted to the Propositional Island Constraint ,  as B claims (101), unless perception 
clauses are analysed as tensed ‘b a re ’ S ’s. Consider:
(9) Who do you think [____ saw Mary?]
This would differ from ex. 8 only in having a complementizer  in the complement clause.
Second,  B argues that the Guyanese  Creole complementizer-l ike elements se ‘fact ive’, go ‘def­
inite pu rpos ive ’, and f i  ‘indefinite pu rpos ive’ are not in fact complementizers ,  but serial verbs. 
This is plausible for go, given its limited distr ibution; it is possible for se (although the fact that 
se c lauses cannot  be fronted could result from the dependent  status of  se as a complementizer,
e.g. necessari ly co-superscr ip ted  with a higher verb of  a certain type); and it is highly implausible 
for f i  (which presumably  cor responds  [how?] to the / / /  discussed in earlier work by B). The evidence 
is the hypothetical  ungrammatical i ty  o f  extract ion from a non-subcategorized f i  clause from Prov­
idence Island Creole:
(10) Iw isaid  ah waan di rien kom (ƒ/ ah don g o ____ ?]
where I want the rain com e so I not go
W h F r o n t in g  is p o s s ib le  o n ly  o u t  o f  s u b c a t e g o r i z e d  c l a u s e s ,  n e v e r  o u t  o f  a d v e r b ia l  p u r p o s iv e s .
The third part o f  B 's  argument  is directed toward establishing (a) that the serial verbs in creole 
languages do not result from a West African subs t ra tum, but ra ther  from an au tonom ous  process 
o f  g ram m ar  construc t ion  w henever  a target language preposit ion was hard to learn (this is clearly 
reminiscent  o f  G iv o n ’s t reatment) ;  and (b) that the serial verb construct ions  go back to finite 
sentential com plem ents ,  in keeping with B ’s earlier claims. In my opinion, claim (a) is implausible; 
claim (b) is groundless ;  and claims (a) and (b) are incompatible.  This is not the place to repeat  the 
debate  ove r  subs t ra tum  vs. universal deve lopm ent ;  subst ra tum influence can only be made plau­
sible, never  proved,  and the issue is s tructurally irrelevant.  B explains the apparen t  absence  of 
instrumental  serial verbs in Saram accan ,  and their presence in Sranan,  by saying that the Portuguese 
preposit ion /ko/ o r  /ku/ ‘w i th ’ was learnable for African slaves (so that it was incorporated  into 
Saram accan) ,  but Eng. with was too marked phonologically to be incorporated  into Sranan;  this 
s t re tches  the r e a d e r ’s credulity.  In fact, the presence  of  serial verbs in creole languages can be 
represen ted  on a two-dimensional  implicational scale: one axis represents  a series o f  thematic 
relations, from central  (in terms of  the predicate)  to peripheral ,  the o ther  axis a num ber  o f  creole 
languages, ar ranged according to the general am ount  o f  West  African features  that they possess. 
It cannot  be d isproved  that phonet ic  propert ies  o f  target language preposit ions contr ibu ted  to their 
incorporat ion into creoles;  but this is certainly not the general pattern.
In creole languages,  serial cons t ruc t ions  differ in structural  coherence  be tween  the verbs  involved 
(which has implications for their  rigidity in m ovem ent  rules), and in possible preposit ion-like char­
acter is t ics;  but now here  do we find any o f  the finite features that B discusses  for percept ion  clauses. 
There  are no replicated subjects ,  no tense  or  aspect  markers  in serial verb cons truc t ions .  On the 
con tra ry ,  we find only bare (preposi t ional?  verbal?) phrases .  N o r  is it possible,  at least for Sranan, 
to claim (as B does) that serial cons t ruc t ions  represent  the older  stage, and preposi t ions the newer 
stage o f  the language. Sebba  (p.c.)  has found a wide range of  new uses for serial constructions, 
and the historical d o cu m en ts  do not show fewer  preposit ions.  From the beginning, it appears, 
preposi t ions  and serial verbs  have existed side by side; the cases  where  both could be used have 
been differentiated by dist inctions o f  focus and defini teness in the a rgum ent  involved.
But suppose  that oblique relat ions were  quite generally marked  by serial verbs  in the early creoles. 
Is it to be expec ted  that these  were  finite cons t ruc t ions?  One would think no t— since it is precisely 
the non-fini teness ,  the ba reness  o f  the serial c lause,  that m akes  it possible for its com plem ent  NP 
to be in te rpre ted  as an (oblique) a rgum ent  o f  the higher verb.
This concludes the survey of the potential bio-program features which can 
be induced from the confrontation of H CE with a number of other creoles. Of 
those features which recur in the detailed discussions of B ’s Chaps. I l l—IV, 
on acquisition and language origins, the only ones which stand up to inspection 
are the distinctions specific/non-specific, state/process, punctual/non-punctual, 
and causative/non-causative— all paradigmatic semantic features. Some of this
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is sensed by B when he writes (65):
‘It is worth noting that the similarities are most striking where a combination of semantic and 
syntactic factors interact; where purely syntactic rules are involved, as with movement rules 
and relativization, there is a lesser degree of identity.’
Why? The tentative explanation is given in a footnote (318):
‘This result would issue very naturally if the semantics of language depended partly on rel­
atively old neural structures while syntax depended partly on relatively new neural structures 
but also partly on extraneural factors intrinsic to the task of building a linear vocal language.’
In this way, then, only s o m e  roots are laid bare by B’s work. However, the 
way he succeeds in linking creole materials with a re-analysis of acquisition 
data, and with a very exciting series of observations about the possible origins 
of language, is noteworthy. His book is certainly worthy of respect even from 
specialists who (like the present reviewer) prefer to make cautious but firmly- 
based statements about their respective intellectual provinces.3
A final note. B s  belief, or conviction, or hypothesis that creole languages 
are somehow simpler in structure than other languages strikes me as odd or 
inappropriate in two ways. First, nothing in my work on the syntax of creole 
languages has suggested that they were in any sense simple; in fact, their com­
plexities continue to baffle me. Second, nothing in my work on Quechua— an 
Amerindian language, typologically as different as possible from a creole— has 
suggested that I am dealing with a somehow unnatural cultural construct, the 
result of a long series of changes away from the biological language. Quechua 
is as simple, or as complicated, as creole languages;4 certainly, both are con­
structed with an implacable logic. Bickerton is to be commended for suggesting 
a series of new ways of identifying that logic.
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3 Roots  is well-produced, contains almost no printing errors, and has both subject and author
indexes.
4 The reader might object that Quechua, a ‘colonial’ language (in the sense that the Incas formed 
colonies throughout the Andes), has itself undergone a process of pidginization. Numerous varieties 
of Quechua were not involved in the Inca expansion, however; and for them the same remark 
holds.
